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Abstract: 
This paper describes and analyzes the implementation of a crawling exchange rate band 
on an electronic trading platform. The placement of limit orders at the central bank’s 
target rate serves as a credible policy statement that may coordinate beliefs of market 
participants. We find for our sample that intervention increases exchange rate volatility 
(and spread) for the next minutes but that intervention days show a lower degree of 
volatility (and spread) than non-intervention days. We also show for intraday data that the 
price impact of interbank order flow is smaller on intervention days than on non-
intervention days. These stabilizing effects, however, rely on the conditions of large 
currency reserves and the existence of capital controls; an electronic market seems to 
support this goal. 
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Exchange Rate Management in Emerging Markets: Intervention via an 
Electronic Limit Order Book 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 The bulk of central bank intervention activity nowadays occurs in emerging 
markets which also play an increasingly important role in current global imbalances. 
Moreover, foreign exchange (FX) markets have changed their organizational structure to 
increasingly move to electronic markets and this structural change is taking place in 
emerging markets, too. This study is the first to analyze the workings of an emerging 
market’s central bank intervention aimed at targeting exchange rates via electronic 
markets by way of a case study relying on unusually detailed information. 
 The rise of emerging economies is not yet adequately reflected in the literature on 
exchange rate management. There is a wealth of studies on foreign exchange 
interventions but almost all of them refer to industrialized economies and most of them 
deal with the few main floating exchange rates.1 Considering the changing institutional 
features of the FX market, it is worthwhile considering how a central bank could use an 
electronic trading venue to manage exchange rates. It is also important to note that in 
recent years, exchange rate management in general and interventions in particular occur 
mostly in emerging market economies. The share of all reserves held by emerging 
countries has increased from about 35% to 75% between 1988 and 2007 (Figure 1). 
Second, effective exchange rate arrangements in the form of crawling pegs or bands 
                                                
1
  Among the several surveys, Sarno and Taylor (2001), Edison (1993), Almekinders (1995) and 
Neely (2005) cover the key issues. 
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dominate floating exchange rates by far, according to Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), and 
have further gained importance over the last two decades (see Figure 2). Third, much 
foreign exchange trading has migrated to electronic markets, a technological evolution 
that applies to emerging markets as well. Therefore, our case study on interventions in an 
electronically traded emerging market currency seems to address an increasingly 
important but up to now neglected field of real world exchange rate management. 
 We report and analyze a unique type of foreign exchange (FX) market 
intervention by the Russian Central Bank which occurred by placing limit orders on an 
electronic limit order book to set an upper bound on the rouble price of a dollar 
(USDRUR). This could be a credible statement of a crawling band that signals a firm 
commitment of the Bank to spend or accumulate reserves as needed to keep the exchange 
rate within the band.2 Indeed, the Russian exchange rate arrangement is classified as a 
“de facto crawling band” and thus belongs to the important broader category of “limited 
flexibility” as shown in Figure 2 (see Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004).3 
Our research covers five days of interventions and is thus a case study whose 
results cannot just be taken as completely conclusive and general. Nevertheless, the 
unusually detailed information about the complete order book allows studying 
intervention effects in an almost “ideal” microstructure setting: we analyze about 2,700 
central bank transactions within a total sample of more than 56,000 orders, among them 
about 30,000 transactions. This data has three distinct advantages: first, it provides 
                                                
2
 We do not use the term “target zone” here as the formal assumptions of the Krugman (1991) 
model, in particular no capital controls, are not satisfied. 
3
 Among the 31 countries in the “de facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%” 
category are further transformation economies (e.g. Czech Republic, Lithuania), middle-income 
African economies (e.g. Algeria, Kenya), a few South-American economies (e.g. Argentina) and 
emerging Asian economies (e.g. India, Malaysia, Philippines). 
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knowledge of the exact time of central bank activity which the prior literature has usually 
inferred from news reports or actual price movements.4 Thus we can analyze precisely 
the effects of intervention in terms of the impact of central bank decisions to intervene 
and the consequent exchange rate effects of purchases or sales of currency.5 Second, the 
analysis undertaken in our paper is unique in that we study what could be called 
“automated intervention” in that the central bank determines a desired band for the 
exchange rate and then places very large limit orders to keep the exchange rate inside 
this band. Third, the data allows analyzing order flows which is quite new to the 
intervention literature.6 
We find that intervention increases exchange rate volatility (and spread) for the 
next few minutes but that intervention days show a lower degree of volatility (and 
spread) than non-intervention days. We also show for intraday data that the price impact 
of interbank order flow is smaller on intervention days than on non-intervention days. 
Finally, we reveal that informed banks take different positions than uninformed banks as 
they tend to trade against the central bank – which reflects a rational stance. Despite this 
position taking, the targeted exchange rate band holds and volatility, spread and price 
                                                
4
  Exceptions to this are the Swiss National Bank, which has made its data public, see Fischer and 
Zurlinden (1999), Payne and Vitale (2003), and Pasquariello (2007). Fischer (2006) shows that 
Reuters news reports of Swiss intervention are often erroneous and bring into question the 
accuracy of such news for timing Swiss interventions. Data sets from Denmark (Fatum and 
Pedersen, 2009) and Canada (Beattie and Fillion, 1999, Fatum and King, 2005) have been 
studied, but are not available to the public. 
5
  Starting with Dominguez and Frankel (1993) more recent studies find an impact of 
intervention, including Humpage (1999) and Dominguez (2003) for the US, Ito (2002, 2007) for 
Japan, Fatum and Hutchison (2003) for Germany (and the US), Kearns and Rigobon (2005) for 
Australia and Disyatat and Galati (2007) for the Czech Republic. Also communication can be 
effective (Fratzscher, 2006) or even falsely rumored interventions (Dominguez and Panthaki, 
2007). 
6
  To our knowledge there are two other studies analyzing interventions in an order flow 
approach: Scalia (2008) has to estimate intervention timing and thus aggregates data to hourly 
frequency, Girardin and Lyons (2007) use customer order flow of a large bank on a daily 
frequency. 
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impact go down. Overall, the intervention band seems to realize stabilizing effects. The 
success of such a regime for an emerging market currency is likely to depend on the 
conditions of large currency reserves and the existence of capital controls—conditions 
which were met for the Russian case under consideration. In 2002, capital controls in 
Russia were quite strict. The rigid controls in existence were imposed after the 1998 
financial crisis. For instance, business firms had to apply on a case-by-case basis for 
permission prior to international transfers of capital. Exporters were required to sell 50 
percent of their foreign currency proceeds to the central bank. Following the 1998 crisis, 
firms had a strong preference to hold convertible, reserve currencies like the U.S. dollar 
or euro, so the currency surrender requirement was viewed as essential to provide 
liquidity to the domestic foreign exchange market. Foreigners traded the rouble in the 
offshore non-deliverable forward (NDF) market and could not participate in the onshore 
market. In 2007, the rouble moved to deliverable status but foreign entities still preferred 
to trade offshore in many cases due to credit and political concerns. To this day, there is 
an active NDF market for the rouble. 
 The paper is organized as follows. In the next section the institutional details of 
the electronic crossing network will be presented along with a detailed overview of the 
data available for analysis. Then in Section III, an empirical examination of the limit 
orders placed by the central bank is undertaken with a focus on its effect on volatility, 
spread, price impact of order flow and order choice. Section IV discusses implications 
for the central bank and, finally, Section V offers a summary and conclusions. 
 
II. INSTITUTIONAL DETAILS 
 5 
 
II.A. The SELT System 
 Local interbank trading in the rouble occurs on an electronic limit order market at 
the MICEX in Moscow and, at the time of interest to this study, March 2002, this market 
determined the official exchange rate of the USDRUR. This country-wide trading at the 
MICEX is called the “unified trading session” or UTS. The structure is that of a multiple 
dealer market without designated market makers. While an interbank market, it is 
expected that much of the trading reflects customer orders received by the participating 
banks. During the period analyzed, the UTS took place for one hour a day from 10:30-
11:30 Moscow time and the only instrument traded was the USDRUR spot rate.7 
 MICEX FX trading occurs on the SELT electronic system that is similar to the 
electronic brokerage systems of Reuters or EBS.8 Like EBS or Reuters, participants on 
SELT just see the top of the book or the best bid and ask prices with associated order 
size. 
 Foreign exchange trading within Russia appears to have a local information 
component.9 Banks in the financial centers of Moscow and St. Petersburg are more likely 
to see the customer order flow of the large Russian corporate clients than banks in other 
cities. The banks on the periphery are also less likely to be as well informed on economic 
policy developments as the banks in the financial centers. Menkhoff and Schmeling 
(2008) show that there is more likely to be a permanent price impact of trades originated 
                                                
7
  Trading was later extended to a four hour session and forward contracts. 
8
  A marginal difference for SELT is that only limit orders, specifying price and quantity desired, 
or cancellations may be submitted. Unlike Reuters or EBS, there are no market orders specifying 
desired quantity at the best price in the order book. To receive immediate execution, an order 
must be submitted that crosses the best price in the order book. Such marketable or crossing limit 
orders are the equivalent of market orders on the SELT. 
9
  See Menkhoff and Schmeling (2008). 
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by Moscow and St. Petersburg banks than banks on the periphery. This is consistent with 
the trades from the financial centers reflecting private information compared to the 
transitory price impact associated with the trades originated by other banks. Following 
these earlier findings, we will structure some of our empirical analysis to take account of 
this institutional feature of the Russian market. 
 Participants on the system see the best bid and offer price plus respective 
quantities. They also see the cumulative buy and sell volumes for the current trading 
session and the last transaction quantity and price. Trades occur anonymously and then 
post-trade counterparty identities are revealed. The fact that the central bank learns the 
identities of private banks that trade at its limit order may serve as a form of central bank 
monitoring that helps to enforce the desired crawling band with a minimum of reserve 
loss. 
 It is likely that using an electronic limit order book as a vehicle for maintaining a 
crawling band is effective only in a case where that crossing network accounts for a very 
significant part of the overall market. In the case of Russia, this was made possible by 
the controls on foreign exchange trading. Foreigners traded roubles in an offshore market 
in the form of non-deliverable forward contracts. So the domestic market was segmented 
from foreign participation and this allowed the central bank to effectively target the 
exchange rate with limit orders on the MICEX.10 Such a mechanism is unlikely to be of 
much use to a country with a convertible currency and open financial markets given the 
current structure of the foreign exchange market. For instance, electronic trading in the 
                                                
10
  We thus observe and analyze the trading dynamics of the domestic market. Within domestic 
markets, the UTS provides much higher liquidity than regional bourses which are only open to 
banks from the respective regions. Moreover, the central bank determines via its interventions the 
official exchange rate at the UTS which is then binding to others. Thus the UTS is the core 
market to exchange information among domestic players. 
 7 
major developed currencies is split across several different platforms and there is no one 
crossing network that has a dominant portion of overall liquidity. Over time, if liquidity 
concentrates on one platform and electronic trading comes to dominate the large and 
active over-the-counter market, it may be possible to think of managing a crawling band 
via an electronic limit order market for the major currencies. But for emerging market 
currencies with segmented domestic foreign exchange markets, the existence of an 
electronic market that pools liquidity for domestic trading may serve as a useful vehicle 
for operating a crawling band arrangement and may thus provide an efficient alternative 
to more conventional interventions in the OTC market. 
 
II.B. Data 
 We study a unique data set on the Russian interdealer FX market for USDRUR 
over a period in March 2002 during which the central bank used the market for 
intervention purposes. There were 722 traders participating in the market at this time. 
While participants only see the best bid and ask orders in real time, we have anonymous 
data on the entire order book, or every submitted and cancelled order and trade that 
occurred on the system during this period. The data are stamped to the second and we 
know the initiator of each transaction, although true identities are unknown to us. The 
data also indicate the regional location of the bank submitting the order. 
 The data cover the period from March 1 to March 22, 2002. This includes days 
with major FX market intervention by the central bank and provides a unique view of a 
central bank using an electronic limit order book to set an exchange rate bound. Table 1 
provides descriptive statistics for each day in the sample. At the bottom of the table, 
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summary statistics are given for March 1 to 7, the days of central bank intervention. On 
these days, the central bank’s limit price served as an upper bound on the price in the 
market. Note that these were the days of heaviest trading volume that month, with 
average trade size of $91,024 on those 5 days compared to $49,401 on the other days. 
The central bank’s ask price was the effective limit in the market and there were many 
more trades that occurred at the central bank’s ask price (2,584) than bid price (109) over 
those days. It is notable that the maximum price in the market on March 4-7 was 
30.9950. The central bank’s ask price bounded the exchange rate from above as the 
market actively consumed the central bank’s liquidity. 
 Table 2 summarizes the order and trade activity of the central bank and the 
private banks. This yields a picture of a market where the private bank trades with the 
central bank tend to be large versus a relatively small size of the private interbank trades 
among themselves. 
 
II.C. The Central Bank’s Intervention Threshold 
Intervention via the limit order book occurs by the central bank placing a large 
limit order at the beginning of a trading session and then meeting all orders that cross 
that price. While limit orders could bound the exchange rate on both sides of the market, 
the Bank of Russia faced depreciation pressures which made their ask limit orders much 
more important as seen in Figure 3. Submitting a very large ask limit order at the start of 
each day allowed the central bank to control the daily rate of depreciation in a kind of 
crawling peg arrangement. 
 9 
 The effect of such an arrangement is clearly seen in a plot of the limit order price 
and counterparty activity for a day when the central bank’s limit price becomes one side 
of the inside spread in the market. The upper panel of Figure 4 illustrates the central 
bank’s limit orders and the market price for March 1-7. On March 1, the central bank set 
a narrow range for the rouble with a bid price of 30.9400 and an ask price of 30.9450, 
which rises to 30.9500 late in the session. It is seen that many trades occurred at both 
sides of the central bank’s orders. Then from March 4 onwards, the ask price limit is 
raised to 30.9950 and the market consistently trades at that price over the day. The 
middle panel of Figure 4 shows the central bank’s limit order volume at the ask price. 
During these days the market traded very often at the central bank’s ask price and the 
quantity on offer fell steadily during these automated intervention activities. 
 
III. EFFECTS OF CENTRAL BANK LIMIT ORDERS 
 
III.A. The Intervention Effect on Volatility and Spread 
The microstructure literature on foreign exchange interventions has not produced 
fully conclusive results about the intervention effect on exchange rate volatility. Whereas 
interventions are tentatively conducted in order to reduce volatility (see Neely, 2008), 
their success has been questioned and high frequency analyses show that interventions 
increase short-term volatility (Dominguez, 2006). 
 The literature on this subject is limited by appropriate data to overcome the 
identification problem: Are interventions related to volatility because they aim for 
stabilizing volatile markets or do they create volatility? At the daily data frequency the 
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relation between interventions and volatility is positive, so intraday data seem helpful in 
solving the causality issue. Indeed, at high frequency there is not much doubt that 
interventions are treated as news by the market and lead to a similar reaction, i.e. a short-
term volatility increase.11 At the daily level, however, there is still controversy whether 
possibly the exchange rate regime may play a role. The target zone model predicts that a 
credible commitment should reduce volatility: it seems plausible that a central bank 
fixing – in our case in particular – the ask price reduces risk to a one-sided risk which 
should lower volatility and spread. There is also evidence from the Canadian experience 
with a pre-announced non-intervention band which seemed to lead to somewhat lower 
volatility due to interventions (Beattie and Fillion, 1999). 
 We use our tick-by-tick data to construct a time series sampled at a 30 second 
frequency to eliminate microstructure noise.12 With this data at hand we examine 
determinants of volatility, measured by the standard deviation of midquotes within a 30 
second interval.13 The approach aims for integrating the intraday and daily view by 
considering the effect of lagged interventions, i.e. during the last few minutes, and also 
considering a dummy variable for intervention days. The equation we estimate via OLS 
with Newey-West HAC standard errors is 
 
4
1 1 1 1
1
ˆt j t j t t t
j
σ α β share λ CBday ε+ + − + +
=
= + ⋅ + ⋅ + +∑ Θ γ  (1) 
                                                
11
  This has been nicely demonstrated by D’Souza (2002) who compares the effect of 
interventions versus replenishment operations of the central bank on volatility: interventions 
increase volatility, non-interventions do not. 
12
  Investigating data aggregated over fixed calendar time is quite common, see e.g. Evans and 
Lyons (2002, 2002a). Results are robust when sampling at a different frequency, e.g. one minute 
(see Payne (2003) for similar findings). 
13
  Using the absolute return over a 30 second interval or the sum of squared returns yields 
qualitatively the same results. 
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where ˆtσ  is the midquote return standard deviation (i.e. the standard deviation computed 
for successive 30 seconds intervals), sharet is the share of total trading volume in a 30 
second time interval transacted with the central bank as counterparty, CBdayt is a dummy 
indicating days with central bank activity14, and Θ t  is a vector of (lagged) control 
variables. Depending on the specification employed, Θ t includes lagged volatility, lagged 
bid-ask spreads (i.e. the mean bid-ask spread over a 30 seconds interval), lagged trading 
volume and deterministic time patterns (the time variable is just the minute of the trading 
session). Note also, that here and in all further econometric estimation exercises, we 
eliminate overnight observations. For example, in the regression above, the first four 30 
second intervals are eliminated from the sample and show up as lagged values in the 
above regression only.  
The left panel of Table 3 contains estimation results for different specifications of 
Θ t and shows that both volatility effects discussed above are significant: first, volatility 
increases directly after interventions and keeps the significantly increased level for about 
one or two minutes, i.e. the βj’s are significant. Second, volatility is significantly lower 
during intervention days as indicated by the highly significant estimate for λ.15 As 
controls in the full specification (iii) we use lagged volatility, then lagged spread and 
transaction volume to consider possible delayed effects from earlier events and finally 
two time variables to consider a possible volatility pattern during the one hour opening 
time. However, whether controls or subsets of these controls are used or not, results 
                                                
14
  Since all intervention days have trades with the central bank right at the beginning of the day 
(see e.g. Figure 2), the fact that the central bank intervenes on a given day is visible to the market 
and, thus, public information. Therefore, we use the CBday dummy in its form described above. 
However, using a dummy variable that indicates lagged intervention days, i.e. interventions at the 
day before, does not change the qualitative conclusions. 
15
  These effects also hold when we test them in isolation and without any controls. 
 12 
remain stable. Therefore, the effect is unlikely to result from higher trading volume due 
to central bank trading since trading volume is included as a control in the regression and 
since trading volume and the share of central bank activity (share) is not significantly 
correlated on intervention days.16 
For reasons of robustness, we re-estimate the above specification with a different 
volatility proxy, namely the high-low range measured over the intervals of 30 seconds. 
Results are reported in the right panel of Table 3 and confirm our findings for a negative 
overall effect of interventions on volatility and for a short-run positive effect. The only 
notable difference is the significance of the lagged share variable. The short-run effects 
of central bank interventions seem to die out somewhat more quickly compared to using 
standard deviations as volatility proxy. We also provide estimates of GARCH(1,1) 
models to further strengthen the robustness of this central result. It can be seen from 
Appendix 1 that the main results regarding the effects of intervention are unchanged 
when using this specification to model conditional spot rate volatility. 
 We conclude that the Russian exchange rate band policy during the sample 
period has two effects on volatility, which have – to the best of our knowledge – not 
been analyzed in a single approach before: automated intervention reduces volatility at 
the daily level and increases volatility in the minutes following a trade at the central 
bank’s ask price. 
 Next we analyze the effect of intervention on bid-ask spreads. There are hardly 
any papers examining this relation as appropriate data are generally unavailable. The 
studies of Chari (2007) and Pasquariello (2007) rely on quotes which are tentatively 
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  As can be seen in Table 1, daily trading volume and CB activity is correlated. However, in the 
intraday analysis conducted here (intervals of 30 seconds), we do not find a high correlation of 
volume and the share variable. 
 13 
wider than effective spreads and do not necessarily reflect market conditions as 
precisely. Both studies find that spread increases after interventions, indicating that a 
volatility reducing effect may be counter balanced by higher transaction costs for 
customers (see Naranjo and Nimalendran, 2000, for daily data). Thus, we test this by 
using an equivalent specification as we did above for volatility: 
 ( )
3
1 1 11
1
j t j t t tt
j
mean spread α β share λ CBday ε+ − + ++
=
= + ⋅ + ⋅ + +∑ Θ γ  (2) 
where (mean spread)t is the average bid-ask spread over a 30 second interval and all 
other variable definitions remain unchanged. Note, that we use only three lags of the 
share variables since further lags are generally insignificant and also increase the AIC. 
Again, one might use a censored regression model. However, the results do not change 
when doing so. 
Results are shown in Table 4 and we find a negative significant sign at the daily 
level and a very short-lived spread increase after interventions. Obviously, spread effects 
go in the same direction as volatility effects in our sample. 
The increase in spreads directly following interventions seems to be – at least 
partly – driven by lower liquidity. We find some (unreported) evidence that limit order 
submission decreases subsequently to reaching the central bank’s quote which might 
explain the temporary surge in spreads. However, the effect on spreads is short-lived and 
is clearly outweighed by the overall reduction in spreads on central bank intervention 
days. 
 Overall, in the case studied here intervention policy seems to contribute towards 
stable markets without noteworthy costs for the public. 
 14 
 
III.B. The Exchange Rate Band Effect on the Price Impact of Order Flow 
We extend the analysis of an automated crawling band effect on trading activity 
by considering high frequency order flow. The theoretical expectation of the price effects 
of order flow is motivated by Girardin and Lyons (2007). Following the intuition of 
Krugman (1991), a credible exchange rate band should dampen the price effect of order 
flow as the limit of the band is approached. Taking into account that order flow 
transports information (Lyons, 2001), days when the central bank’s limit is reached 
should be characterized by a lower price impact of order flow, i.e. that the exchange rate 
is less responsive to the arrival of information. Girardin and Lyons (2007) do not find 
clear evidence for such an effect for daily end user order flow of Citibank in the Yen/US 
dollar market. 
 We run price impact regressions of order flow on returns, as in Evans and Lyons 
(2002), i.e. we estimate via OLS a regression of the following form, again on the basis of 
30 second intervals: 
 
1 0 1 1 2 1 1 3 1 1 1 1Δ t t t t t t t t tm β β OF β OF CBday β OF CBday Dist γΘ ε+ + + + + + + += + + + + +  (3) 
where Δmt+1 is the midquote return over the chosen interval, OFt+1 is the order flow 
indicator17 and CBday is a dummy that equals one on intervention days.18 Dist denotes 
the average distance to the upper limit of the Central Bank’s crawling band, and, again, 
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  The order flow indicator equals one if a trade is buyer initiated and minus one otherwise. All 
order flow indicators in a 30 second interval are aggregated to yield the aggregate order flow 
indicator for the respective interval which is used here. 
18
  One may think of this specification as a varying parameter model where 
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Θ t  contains control variables, namely lagged midquote returns and order flows. T-
statistics are based on Newey-West HAC standard errors. 
For this specification we again rely on the 30 seconds frequency, and we exclude 
all trades at the central bank limit because the impact is in these cases necessarily zero. 
Results presented in the left panel of Table 5 show that the relation between order flow 
and returns is highly positive and of the same order as in other studies.19 The interaction 
term of order flow with the central bank dummy is significantly negative. This indicates 
that price impact is dampened due to the intervention band. A Wald test of the restriction 
β1+β2=0, which would indicate that the price impact completely vanishes on intervention 
days, cannot be rejected at any reasonable level of significance. Furthermore, the 
interaction term with the distance variable Dist tends to be positive and is marginally 
significant. The estimated coefficient in specification (v) of Table 5 indicates that a one 
standard deviation increase in the distance variable increases the price impact of order 
flow by slightly less than 20%. Therefore, trades occurring farther away from the Central 
Bank’s crawling band have a tentatively higher price impact which seems to be 
intuitively related to the “honeymoon effect” of Krugman’s (1991) target zone model as 
suggested by Girardin and Lyons (2007). 
We complement the above analysis by running the same sort of regression with a 
measure of unexpected order flow following Pasquariello and Vega (2007). While the 
above regressions directly use order flow as a determinant of midquote returns, attention 
                                                
19
  Evans and Lyons (2002a) find that the order flow coefficient is 0.6 basis points per $10 
million for DEM/USD and goes up for smaller markets, such as 2.4 for the Australian dollar, 
while Scalia (2008) finds an even higher value of 7.6 for the Czech koruna. The order flow 
coefficients in Table 4 are for order flow indicators and have to be multiplied by a factor of 20 to 
obtain the impact per $10 million. Table 4 suggests that the impact on non-intervention days is 
about 0.123, so that we have an average impact of 0.123×20 ≈ 2.5 basis points. 
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also focuses on the effect of the unexpected part of order flow, i.e. order flow shocks 
hitting the market. To compute this measure of unexpected order flow, we estimate logit 
models with the order flow indicator as dependent variable and lagged order flows and 
midquote returns as right-hand side variables. The regression uses tick-by-tick data in 
event time. The residuals from this logit regression are free of predictable components in 
the raw order flow indicator and should thus provide a better measure of information 
shocks than raw order flow itself. For the empirical analysis we aggregate the 
generalized residuals from these regressions to the 30 seconds frequency as above and 
re-run regression (3) with this measure of unexpected order flow.20 
Results are given in the right panel of Table 5 (specifications (vi) – (viii)). 
Eliminating predictable components from the raw order flow measure does not change 
our general results. This conclusion is similar to Pasquariello and Vega (2007) and it 
shows that our results are not driven by simple endogeneity problems caused by 
feedback trading where causality (partly) runs from midquote changes to order flow. 
 Finally, we can exercise another robustness test due to the high frequency data 
available which is able to discriminate between mechanistic transitory liquidity effects of 
order flow and its permanent information transmission. We estimate price impacts 
according to the Hasbrouck (1991) metric, i.e. as the cumulative response of midquote 
returns to order flow shocks in a SVAR-model. More specifically, we estimate a SVAR 
with midquote returns and market order flow as endogenous variables: 
 1 1 1 2( ) [ ]t t t tAy Γ L y Bυ withVar υ I+ + += + =  (4) 
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 Estimation of the logit model in event time is done separately for each day. As usual, we 
eliminate overnight observations and the lag length for past order flow and midquote returns is 
determined separately for each day by minimizing the AIC. The average lag length across days is 
one for lagged order flow and two for past midquote returns. 
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so that the SVAR is just-identified and causality runs from order flow to midquote 
returns via α1. Γ(L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator and the number of lags is 
chosen by the AIC for each subset of observations employed in the estimation detailed 
below. Permanent price impacts are computed by calculating the long-run cumulative 
response of midquote returns to order flow shocks (see e.g. Evans and Lyons, 2002a, or 
Payne, 2003 for applications of this procedure to FX spot rates). 
The first row in Table 6 shows permanent price impacts of order flow on returns 
for intervention days (left column) and non-intervention days (right column). As can be 
seen, and corroborating the evidence from the Evans-Lyons-type regressions in Table 5, 
order flow has a much larger price impact on non-intervention days than on intervention 
days, consistent with our expectations.21 
 In order to further examine whether the degree of price impact robustly depends 
on the fact of interventions or not, we compare the average price impact on intervention 
days with non-intervention days under various market conditions. Thus we condition the 
price impact analyses on variables that reflect market conditions typically found to be 
important in microstructure analysis. We use transacted volume as a proxy for market 
activity, midquote return volatility as a rough measure of information arrival and spreads 
to reflect the degree of asymmetric information in the market.22 We then split the sample 
                                                
21
  The price impact of 0.721 for “all trades” on intervention days in Table 5 roughly translates 
into a midquote movement of 2.4 pips. This is small compared to the permanent impact on non-
intervention days which is about 4.9 pips. 
22
  These variables are also detrended to eliminate typical intraday patterns and thus to rule out 
the indirect influence of time. Therefore, we project each of the sorting variables on 60 time 
dummies representing the minute of the trading session. We then use the predicted values of this 
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into two subsamples according to whether a sorting variable is below or above the 
sample median and the permanent price impact of order flow is calculated for 
intervention days and non-intervention days. Results of this procedure are given in the 
remaining rows of Table 6. 
 Results show marked variation in price impacts under different market 
conditions. Price impacts tend to be higher in times of more market activity, higher 
volatility and higher spreads, so that times of higher market activity seem to indicate 
more information processing. Most interesting for our analysis is, however, that price 
impacts differ in an economically significant way between intervention and non-
intervention days. Price impacts are much higher on non-intervention days in all regimes 
except the high volatility regime where the price impact increases only slightly. This 
again corroborates our finding that interventions dampen the impact of information 
arrival on spot rate movements. 
 
III.C. Order Choice of (Un)Informed Traders during Intervention Days 
We know from the earlier descriptive parts of this paper that there seem to be 
participants trading “against” the intervention band as can be seen from the loss of 
reserves in the bottom panel of Figure 4. At first sight this may be unexpected, given the 
credibility of the intervention band. A plausible interpretation of this fact may be, 
however, that a later depreciation of the rouble is expected due to some pressure from 
fundamentals and that either informed banks or informed customers of these banks trade 
                                                                                                                                           
regression as the intraday pattern and divide the actual observations by the predicted value of the 
corresponding interval. 
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on their anticipation.23 In the following, we therefore seek to answer the following 
question: who is trading against the central bank and how do they do it? 
There is indeed Reuters headline news supporting the view of a fundamental 
pressure towards rouble depreciation. On March 4 for example, there is Reuters news in 
which a market participant reports that “there are roubles available on the market. […] 
and banks used the opportunity to take long dollar positions expecting the rouble to go 
further down”. On another case, on March 6 a market participant is quoted with the 
following statement: “it is the usual story of past few sessions: banks build up 
speculative positions (against the rouble) early, then the central bank comes out to the 
unified session offering dollars at 30.9950 and the market obeys, […]”. 
To explore who might be trading against the central bank’s crawling band, we 
exploit another feature of our data, i.e. its disaggregation of trading banks into more or 
less informed participants, as discussed in Section II.A. Regarding the analytical 
framework, we use an order choice approach and analyze who is trading against the band 
and who is supporting the band. We do this by focusing on the following “distance 
variable”: Distance from central bank’s ask is the difference between the actual ask price 
of the central bank and the last transaction price (in pips). This variable is used to test 
whether the likelihood of trading against the central bank (the likelihood is high when 
the distance is low) influences the behavior of traders. If the heavy buying at the central 
bank’s ask is noise trading, then the share of buy orders should be largely independent of 
the distance from the intervention price. Moreover, there should be no difference 
between more and less informed traders. 
                                                
23
  In the latter case, that is pressure from customer trading, banks have to cover their open 
positions. 
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There may of course be other relevant determinants of the trading direction and 
the empirical order choice literature indeed suggests that one should model trading 
decisions as a function of momentum, herding, ask volume, bid volume and time, in 
order to capture time-varying dynamics of market conditions (Hasbrouck and Saar, 2009, 
Ranaldo, 2004). Thus, we control the decision to buy or sell, i.e. the order choice, by a 
set of determinants which are standard in the respective literature: 
Momentum, which is measured as the midquote change over the past 30 seconds 
preceding an order. As in earlier studies we direction-adjust order flow by multiplying it 
by minus one if the current order is a sell order. This price momentum is intended to 
capture price pressure which induces adjustments in the order strategy of traders. 
Learning, which is measured as cumulative order flow over the past 30 seconds. 
Similar to the above price momentum, this variable is direction adjusted. We include it to 
capture the general trading direction. Since traders seem to learn from observed order 
flow (Lyons, 2001), changing order flow trends might induce different order placement 
strategies. 
Ask volume is the size of the best order on the ask side of the book and thus 
visible on the trading screen. Similarly, bid volume is the size of the best order on the bid 
side of the book and also visible on the trading screen. 
Same side volume is measured as the volume at the bid just prior to a buy order’s 
submission and as the volume at the ask just prior to a sell order’s submission, 
respectively. 
Other side volume is measured as the volume at the ask just prior to a buy order’s 
submission and as the volume at the bid just prior to a sell order’s submission, 
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respectively. This and the preceding variable are suggested by Parlour’s (1998) model of 
limit order placement. The two volume variables are found to be important empirically 
e.g. in Griffiths et al. (2000) or Ranaldo (2004). 
Time indicates the minute of the trading session (1, …, 60) and is used to capture 
deterministic time patterns. 
We estimate a logit model, where the dependent variable is coded 1 if the market 
order is a buy and 0 for a sell. The model is estimated separately for two groups: there 
are trades from the center, i.e. banks from Moscow and St. Petersburg, who are expected 
to be better informed, and others who are expected to be relatively uninformed. 
Estimation results are presented in Table 7.24 
 We see that trading behavior of both groups is different. Traders from the center, 
i.e. Moscow and St. Petersburg, buy more when the price comes closer to the upper 
intervention level, whereas traders from the periphery behave in a contrary manner.25 
Among the control variables, learning is the only one which has the same significant sign 
for both groups. The further variables are different as center traders buy with momentum 
and later in the session. Periphery traders, however, buy more when the ask volume is 
larger, bid volume smaller and earlier in the session. Overall, the significantly different 
behavior of better informed center and less informed periphery traders suggests that 
                                                
24
 Following the suggestion of a referee, we have also estimated the model without the learning 
variable. Results are qualitatively unchanged. 
25
  As another approach to address this issue, we examine by way of a logit model the order 
choice between marketable limit orders that receive immediate execution (1) and all other limit 
orders (0)(see Appendix 2). Again, if not due to heterogeneity in trading motives, there should be 
no difference between the likelihood of using one of both order types, with respect to price 
distance from the central bank’s ask. However, we find that Center traders are more likely to 
submit orders for immediate execution when the price is closer to the upper intervention band, 
i.e. they trade more aggressively when the price comes close to the central bank’s limit. 
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traders’ buys at the ask may be no accident but a sort of speculative mini-attack on the 
crawling band. 
 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CENTRAL BANK 
 
 The posting of limit orders is an effective device for containing exchange rate 
movements within narrow bounds. Our case study shows that the Bank was successful in 
stabilizing the market in several respects. However, what are conditions for such a policy 
to be implemented in general and which role does the electronic market form play? 
 The ability of maintaining a credible exchange rate band depends upon the central 
bank posting a quantity that is large relative to the market so that whenever the central 
bank’s quote rises to the top of the order book, the market cannot exhaust the quantity on 
offer and move the exchange rate outside of the central bank’s desired range. In this 
analysis of the Russian central bank’s activity on an electronic crossing network, it is 
clearly the case that the central bank’s limit orders are very large relative to the quantities 
traded on this market. This conveys the image of a credible crawling exchange rate band. 
Credibility of this exchange rate arrangement seems to be supported by strict 
capital controls which separate the domestic market from international financial markets. 
This institutional requirement ensures a limited market power of private participants who 
might trade against the central bank’s intentions. As capital controls are widespread in 
emerging markets, it seems reasonable that similar intervention strategies should work in 
other emerging markets controlling large currency reserves in relation to the respective 
currency market volume. Interestingly, the market organization of a modern electronic 
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crossing network is no disadvantage in implementing a credible exchange rate band, as 
we argue below. 
 The literature on intervention has often focused on the channel through which 
intervention changes exchange rates. The typical discretionary central bank intervention 
is accompanied by sterilization of reserve flows in order to leave the money supply 
unchanged. Sterilization also seems to occur in Russia during the period we study. Since 
interest rates and prices are left unchanged, the usual avenues through which exchange 
rates are changed include the portfolio balance and signaling channels, or coordination of 
expectations (e.g. Reitz and Taylor, 2008). In the special case where intervention occurs 
through limit orders on an electronic crossing network, it may be less likely that relative 
bond supplies are changed so that the portfolio balance channel is not a likely candidate. 
There is clear signaling of the central bank’s desired exchange rate with the posting of a 
limit order that the market learns must come from the central bank. In addition, such a 
posted limit order, with a very large quantity associated, serves as a credible mechanism 
for coordinating the expectations of market participants. 
However, when a central bank supports the domestic currency by providing a 
perfectly elastic supply of dollars at a given exchange rate, reserve losses will be 
associated with trades that occur. In the case under study, where we know the trade sizes, 
it is possible for every trader to calculate the (cumulated) reserve losses associated with 
the intervention activity. The lower panel of Figure 4 depicts the cumulative loss of 
reserves. The changing slope of this line reflects trade sizes at the central bank’s ask 
price. Over the week as a whole, the central bank sold approximately $338 million 
dollars for roubles during the electronic trading sessions which equals about one percent 
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of reserves. If reserve losses are estimated to be reaching a threshold that would lead to 
the central bank’s removal of the limit order, one would expect traders to be even more 
aggressive in trading at the central bank’s price. This may be seen as a short-term 
disadvantage for the central bank but the visibility of interventions and thus changes in 
reserves will also have a disciplining effect on the intervention policy of a rational 
central bank. Thus, visibility of reserve losses should incentivize long-term credibility of 
exchange rate management. 
The data indicate that on March 7 there were some large trades late in the session 
as the loss of reserves increases steeply on this day. It is notable that on the next day, the 
central bank allowed the official exchange rate to depreciate to 31.1 as seen in Figure 4. 
Thus, the reserve losses occurring on March 7 may represent a sort of “mini speculative 
attack”. The fact that there was no limit order placed at 30.9950 on March 8, so that the 
exchange rate was allowed to depreciate, is consistent with the central bank defending its 
reserves by allowing the depreciation. As the Russian central bank was far away from 
exhausting its reserves (the losses were only about one percent of total reserves), its 
decision was deliberate in realizing a crawling peg. We interpret this episode as evidence 
that even in a regime with capital controls it is costly for the central bank to support its 
currency against obvious fundamental trends. It is often the case that a central bank’s 
goal is not to achieve a hard peg but to reduce volatility in the exchange rate and 
moderate the rate of depreciation in line with a crawling peg regime. 
 Finally, a potential central bank advantage of intervening in the passive form of 
posting limit orders is that the identity of counterparties is revealed after each trade is 
completed. This information may be useful in enforcing good behavior on the part of the 
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private banks as they know the central bank can monitor their trades when the central 
bank is the counterparty. If the central bank exerts moral suasion or other enforcement 
mechanisms, which may be more effective in emerging compared to industrialized 
countries, then private banks may regulate their trades at the central bank price to avoid 
any appearance of an attack on the central bank. This mechanism may be weakened, 
however, if private banks just intermediate trades for their informed customers who are 
not necessarily revealed to the central bank. 
 In summary, the Russian case may demonstrate to emerging economies with 
large reserves and capital controls a way of implementing a stabilizing crawling 
exchange rate band. The existence of an electronic currency market may offer 
advantages in executing such a policy. 
 
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study provides evidence regarding central bank intervention activity in an 
emerging market via an electronic limit order book. Thus we contribute to the 
increasingly important field of interventions in emerging markets but we also contribute 
– due to unusually detailed data – to measuring the precise impact that interventions may 
have in modern electronic currency markets. 
We have focused on a short period of 2002 when the Russian Central Bank 
maintained a exchange rate band for the rouble price of a dollar by posting limit orders 
on an electronic crossing network. The central bank orders were very large relative to the 
market and served as a credible signaling device to private market participants. 
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Due to available deep information about the order book, we are able to analyze 
this widespread exchange rate arrangement in a way not being tackled in the earlier 
literature.26 We find for our sample that trades at the central bank’s limit price 
simultaneously induce a downward shift in volatility on a daily frequency, i.e. they 
reduce the overall level of volatility. However, at the intraday frequency, such trades 
induce a higher transitory volatility that lasts for a few minutes. The same results hold 
for spreads, although the transitory effects on bid-ask spreads are weaker than for return 
volatility. The dampening effect of trades associated with defense of the exchange rate 
band can also be recognized from the lower price impact of order flow on days when the 
central bank is an active participant in the market. There is evidence of a stabilizing 
effect as the price impact falls the closer price is to the central bank’s limit. Clearly, 
central bank policy must be credible, which is supported here by the very large limit 
orders. It would be interesting to know whether our finding holds in different samples. 
Finally, we see from the intraday order choice analysis that more informed 
traders expect – in line with fundamentals and correctly in retrospect – a further decline 
of the rouble since they trade aggressively against the upper limit of the exchange rate 
band. This is in contrast to the behavior of the uninformed and is consistent with rational 
speculation from informed traders in combination with an intervention policy to 
successfully calm the market. It is likely that the central bank seeks to smooth the path of 
rouble depreciation in a crawling peg arrangement rather than defend a rigid peg at some 
particular exchange rate. 
                                                
26
  Findings are not driven by particular characteristics of the Russian market as the daily 
interbank trading session at the MICEX has characteristics like those of other electronic crossing 
networks. 
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 Since market participants know the size of trades that occurred, the central bank’s 
reserve losses from trades at its offer price, i.e. $338 million over the week under study, 
are easily calculated. This transparency of the central bank’s position is one potential 
disadvantage of using such a mechanism to limit exchange rate changes. However, there 
may be an informational counterweight in that the central bank also learned who was 
trading at their limit price as after each trade is completed, the parties learn each other’s 
identity. So the central bank could potentially use moral suasion or other means to 
discipline any private banks that might be viewed as abusing the system or contributing 
to a speculative attack. 
 The provision of liquidity via an electronic limit order book is only likely to serve 
as an effective exchange rate limiting device in a market where over-the-counter trading 
is small compared to the electronic market and liquidity is concentrated on one trading 
platform. In the case of Russia, non-residents traded in an offshore market due to a lack 
of full convertibility of the rouble so that the domestic market was segmented from 
outside pressures. This allowed the central bank to effectively facilitate a crawling 
exchange rate band using limit orders. 
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